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The present status of CPLR 3216 is clearly in a state of confusion. It is submitted, however, that the constitutional mandate
of article VI, section 30 lodges power in the legislature to enact
a rule such as 3216. In fact, that power was expressly given to
the legislature by the first constitution of the State of New York,
in 1846, and has continued without interruption to our present
constitution. Moreover, as Justice Stevens urged in his dissent in
Cohn, 3216 is not operative until the conditions precedent have
been fulfilled, and one such condition is a demand that a note of
issue be filed within 45 days of the demand. Since a case is not7
actually on a court's calendar until a note of issue has been filed,
it is difficult to contend that the rule unconstitutionally interferes
with a court's inherent power to control its calendars.
CPLR 3216: Fourth department applies amendment retroactively.
The retroactive application of amended 3216, effective on September 1, 1967, has been the subject of conflict recently between
the first and second departments of the appellate division,88 i.e.,
the second department has quite consistently given the amendment
retroactive effect, 9 whereas the first department has not.90
The appellate division, fourth department, in a recent case,
Williams v. Baker,91 reversed special term's order of March 3,
1967, and denied defendant's 3216 motion to dismiss because of his
failure to give the notice provided for under the new 3216(d).
The court reasoned that an appellate tribunal usually applies the
law as it exists on the date it makes its decision, "notwithstanding
the fact that a change has been made in the law since the date of
the appealed order." 92 Thus, the fourth department is now, apparently, applying 3216 retroactively.
CPLR 3216: Third department does not give amendment retroactive effect.
A condition precedent to a 3216 dismissal for failure to prosecute is that movant serve a written demand upon plaintiff, requiring that prosecution be resumed and a note of issue be filed within
8
7See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 30 App. Div. 2d 74, 78, 289 N.Y.S.2d
771, 775 (1st Dep't 1968) (dissenting opinion).
88 See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHIN's L.
REv. 436, 456 (1968); 43 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 142, 158 (1968); 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 312 (1967).
89See
Terasaka v. Rehfield, 28 App. Div. 2d 1011, 284 N.Y.S.2d 168
(2d Dep't 1967); Kaprow v. Jacoby, 28 App. Div. 2d 722, 281 N.Y.S.2d
591 (2d Dep't 1967).
90See Leonard v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d
844, 281 N.Y.S2d 555 (1st Dep't 1967).
9129 App. Div. 2d 915, 290 N.Y.S.2d 188 (4th Dep't 1968).
921d.
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45 days of the demand.9 3 Prior to the 1967 amendment of 3216,
the law was unsettled as to whether a written demand was required
where the ground for dismissal was "general delay," or whether it
was required only where the ground was failure to file a note of
issue.94 Clearly, under present law, a demand is necessary in either
situation. 95
In a recent case, Horn v. Cooley," the appellate division, third
department, reversed special term, Schenectady County, and granted
defendant's motion to dismiss under 3216, on the ground of
"general delay." While no 45 day demand was served, the fact
that a note of issue was filed, and the circumstance of inordinate
delay in prosecution-since 1960-demanded a dismissal despite
the lack of demand.
In light of 3216's amendment in 1967, which would require
a written demand under the facts of the instant case, practitioner
should be aware, that the third department is apparently not applying 3216 retroactively-and to that extent, is now following the
first department.97
Collateral Estoppel: Glaser doctrine no longer followed in first
department.
Gkser v. Huette9 8 established the rule that co-defendants in a
prior action are precluded from using collateral estoppel defensively
against each other in a subsequent action because they were not
adversaries in the prior action. Since there was no duty to defend
against each other in the former action, they can relitigate the issue
of negligence as between themselves in a later action.
In recent years, technical requirements for the defensive use
of collateral estoppel have been liberalized by the Court of Appeals.
03This requirement became effective on September 1, 1967. 3216, as
originally enacted, did not require any demand. The 1964 amendment added
a demand requirement, but that amendment was repealed when the present
amendment was enacted.
4For a discussion of this problem, see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216,
supp. commentary 311-16 (1967).
95 CPLR 3216(b) (3) provides that a court may not take any initiative
and no motion shall be made until a written demand is served upon plaintiff.
The rigidity of this requirement is strengthened somewhat by the express
denomination of this procedure as a "condition precedent."
CPLR 3216(d) provides that where a note of issue has been filed, with
or without demand, the court cannot consider any delay prior to the filing
of the note of issue.
96 30 App. Div. Zd 729, 291 N.Y.S.2d 549 (3d Dep't 1968).
97 For a discussion of the conflict regarding the retroactive application
of 3216, see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 302, 330 (1968); 43 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 142, 159 (1968); 42 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 438, 456 (1968).
9s232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374 (1st Dep't), aff'd vinem., 256 N.Y.
686, 177 N.E. 193 (1931).

